Discovery of Liability Insurance: Broadening of the Doctrine in California by Clark, William S.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 2 Article 11
1-1961
Discovery of Liability Insurance: Broadening of the
Doctrine in California
William S. Clark
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
William S. Clark, Discovery of Liability Insurance: Broadening of the Doctrine in California, 13 Hastings L.J. 273 (1961).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol13/iss2/11
NOTES
DISCOVERY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE:
Broadening of the Doctrine in California
In Pettie v. Superior Court," the plaintiff suffered injury in an automobile
collision with one Roerman (the real party in interest, hereinafter referred
to as defendant). She commenced a personal injury suit to recover damages
and thereafter submitted written interrogatories to the defendant demand-
ing to know whether or not defendant carried liability insurance and if so,
who the insurer was and what the policy limits were.2 The defendant filed
a written answer setting forth the name and address of her insurer, but
objected to the interrogatory seeking the limits of policy coverage on the
grounds that such a question was not related to the subject matter involved
in the pending action, that the information sought was not admissible as
evidence, and that it did not appear to be reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. The district court of appeal, basing
its decision on another recent California case,3 issued a writ of mandate
commanding the lower court to set aside its order sustaining defendant's
objections and to issue an order overruling defendant's objections to the
interrogatories. In so doing the court indicated both its continued willing-
ness to allow wide ranging pre-trial discovery and its reluctance to limit the
discovery procedure to matters put in issue by the pleadings.4 Through
this decision what has been a procedural stumbling block in many jurisdic-
tions5 has been eliminated in California.
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the sole effect of Pettie
is to give further interpretation to California's new discovery procedures,
for the decision is based upon both procedural and substantive points of
law. To analyze the decision in terms of the discovery statutes alone with-
out taking into account California Insurance Code section 11580 would be
to ignore the court's own rationale for its decision. Said the court, "The
respondent court and amicus curiae overlook or minimize the fact Superior
Insurance [upon which plaintiff relied] is essentially based on holdings that,
under Insurance Code section 11580, a contractual relation is created be-
' 178 Cal. App. 2d 680, 3 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1960).
2The plaintiff argued that such information was discoverable under the provisions
of CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§2016, 2030 (Supp. 1961).
3 Laddon v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 2d 391, 334 P.2d 638 (1959).
4See id. at 395, 334 P.2d at 640; accord, Maddox v. Grauman, 205 Ky. 422, 265
S.W.2d 939 (1954).
5 Compare Orgel v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), Brackett v. Woodall
Food Prods., 12 F.R.D. 4 (D.C. Tenn. 1951) and People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 IMl.
2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957) [allowing discovery], with McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D.
360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955), and Callimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. II. 1958) [denying
discovery].
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tween the insurer under an automobile liability policy and third persons
who may be negligently injured by the insured .. ."
On the one hand the substantive element of a contractual relationship
between insurer and injured must be considered; and on the other, the pro-
cedural machinery of discovery and its operation.7 It is the combination
of these two factors which makes California one of the most liberal states
in allowing discovery of the extent of liability insurance coverage.'
This article briefly reviews these two areas of California law and attempts
to draw some conclusions as to the combined effect of these upon the ob-
ligations of liability insurers, the rights and privileges of the insured and
the injured, and the extent to which the requirement to reveal the amount
of liability insurance helps or hinders the purpose of pre-trial procedure.
The Procedural Aspect
The 1957 Regular Session of the Legislature of California enacted new
provisions relating to depositions and discoveryf This new Discovery Act
is largely based upon the corresponding provisions in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure?' Therefore the construction and interpretation given to
the Federal Rules are helpful in understanding the new California proce-
dures."' Particularly important in applying code section 2016(b) to a situa-
tion is the manner in which the phrase, "Relevant to the subject matter
involved in the pending action" is construed by the courts.
The California courts, since the new discovery rules were enacted, have
unanimously agreed that the provisions of the discovery statutes are to be
liberally construed.12 But "relevancy" and "subject matter" are very broad
terms and to have some significance must be given a frame of reference.
Thus our recourse to the Federal Rules and their interpretation which em-
ploy much of the same language23
Since the leading case of Hickman v. Taylor,1 4 the federal courts have
held to the premise that one of the purposes of discovery proceedings is to
bring to light all information which might be of use to the parties in prepara-
tion for trial." To this end either party may compel the other to disgorge
6 178 Cal. App. 2d at 684, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
7 See Laddon v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 2d at 395, 334 P.2d at 640 (1959).
8 Before 1957 the contractual relationship between insurer and injured was the sole
ground for allowing discovery. Now the liberalized rules of discovery many require
revelation of liability insurance even without the aid of Insurance Code section 11580.
See Rolf Holmes, Inc. v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 2d 876, 9 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1960).
9 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §§ 2016-35 (Supp. 1961).
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
11 See Grand Lake Drive In, Inc. v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 2d 122, 3 Cal.
Rptr. 621 (1960).
1a E.g., Clark v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 2d 577, 2 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1960);
Laddon v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 2d 391, 334 P.2d 638 (1959); Grover v. Supe-
rior Court, 161 Cal. App. 2d 644, 327 P.2d 212 (1958).
1' See generally Report of Committee on the Administration of Justice of the State
Bar of California, 31 CAL. S. BAR J. 204 (1956).
14329 U.S. 495 (1947).
15 E.g., California v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 261 (N.D. Cal. 1961); Republic of
Italy v. De Angelis, 14 F.R.D. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Rosseau v. Langley, 7 F.R.D. 170
(S.D.N.Y. 1945).
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whatever facts he has in his possession. Therefore the scope of a discovery
interrogation may be exceedingly broad and is not closely limited by the
restrictions of a trial examination.1 If this were not so the entire value of
the procedure would be destroyed and the sought-after goal of expediting
the disposition of litigation would be lost. This explains the great hesitancy
of the courts in putting any technical restrictions on discovery procedures
which might reduce them to a formalized series of questions and answers
not much more informative than the pleadings. The scope of the examina-
tion should not be limited unless the information sought is clearly privileged
or irrelevant, and inquiry should not be limited to matters relevant only to
the precise issues presented by the pleadings.17 Just how much latitude this
gives a party in forcing revelation of facts in any given case depends upon
the particular circumstances there involved and is determined by the court
after weighing the interests in disclosure against the interests in secrecy.18
While courts are sympathetic toward the liberal use of discovery pro-
ceedings, they will not allow explorations into purely collateral or peripheral
matters.' Many courts have cataloged the discovery of liability insurance
and policy limits in this area of irrelevance and immateriality.20 These
courts declare that the financial status of the defendant has nothing to do
with the merits of the case, is not admissible as evidence, and is not calcu-
lated to lead to admissible evidence. In short, they hold the fact of insurance
coverage not relevant to the subject matter of a personal injury or property
damage case. The subject matter being the injury or damage sustained by
the complaining party, interrogatories which are not directed in some way
toward uncovering facts about such injury go beyond the bounds of statu-
tory authority. The fact of insurance coverage is not linked in any manner
to an explanation of what happened or how and why the injury was in-
curred. It in no way establishes or leads to a fact which might aid in proving
negligence on the part of defendant.21 Therefore, from a legalistic viewpoint
it is arguable that the ability of a party to satisfy a judgment is not one of
the issues of law involved in a personal injury trial and should therefore not
be discoverable.
Relevancy, like causation, covers a spectrum of facts from the event itself
to the most distant and apparently unrelated happening. The courts are
forced to draw a line at some point in this continuum and declare that
everything on the far side of the line is irrelevant.22 Relevancy then, in some
respects, is analogous to proximate cause in that the matter is not one clearly
104 MooRE, FEDmaAL PRACrcE § 26.15 at 1062 (2d ed. 1950).
17 Id. at 1065; Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943).
Is See United States v. Kohler Co., 9 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Lewis v. United
Airlines Transp. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 946 (Conn. 1939); Union Trust Co. v. Superior
Court, 11 Cal. 2d 449, 81 P.2d 150 (1938); Comment, Developments in the Law-Dis-
covery, 74 HAv. L. REv. 940, 1008 (1961).
19 E.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. at 507 (1947).
2 0 See, e.g., McNelley v. Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); McClure v.
Boeger, 105 F. Supp. 612 (D.C. Pa. 1952).21 Contra, in states where failure to show financial responsibility disqualifies one to
drive and driving with a void license creates a presumption of negligence. See generally
5 STAN. L. RExv. 326 (1953).
22 17 Ams. Jur. Discovery & Inspection § 11 (1957).
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defined by statute, but is left to the discretion of the court in each case,
there being only general guidelines and precedents for the courts to follow.23
Thus where the insurer is directly responsible to the injured party the fact
of insurance is obviously relevant.24 But where the insurer is liable only
after a judgment against insured, the matter is not so clearly settled.2,
The problem confronting the courts in this regard is whether or not the
existence and amount of liability insurance are facts which should be used
by a plaintiff in evaluation of his cause of action. Any fact which might
disclose negligence, recklessness, contributory negligence, or extent of dam-
age should be discoverable. The old rules of procedure allowed discovery
of such facts on the basis that they contained evidence relating to the merits
of the action or the defense therein. But the present test is relevancy to the
subject matter which is believed to be a broader and more liberal test.26
Information which was obtainable before the adoption of the 1957 Discovery
Act should, wherever possible, be obtainable after its adoption.27
Liability insurance policy limits is a fact further removed from any of
the above issues and enables a party to determine the worth of his cause of
action by relating it to defendant's ability to pay. In the past this economic
approach to evaluating a cause of action has been specifically rejected by
a number of jurisdictions.2 8 California decisions prior to the new Discovery
Act also indicate that the courts would have denied discovery of liability
insurance because such fact is not material to any issue potential or actual
presented in the basic action.29 The two early California decisions allowing
discovery of liability insurance are both based upon the discoverable interest
an injured party has because of the contractual relationship created by
statute, a topic which will be discussed in the next section of this article.3o
In a recent decision"' the United States District Court in Montana, al-
though allowing discovery of policy limits for the admitted purpose of ap-
praising the case for settlement negotiation, recognized valid arguments
against its position in stating, "Neither should expedience or the desire to
dispose of lawsuits without trial, however desirable that may be from the
standpoint of relieving congested calendars, be permitted to cause us to lose
22 See Dowell v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 483, 304 P.2d 1009 (1956); Union Oil
Co. v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 286, 311 P.2d 640 (1957).
24 See Acme Freight Lines v. Blackmon, 131 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1942); Connel v.
Clark, 88 Cal. App. 2d 941, 200 P.2d 26 (1948).
25 See Baggett v. Jackson, 244 Ala. 404, 13 So. 2d 572 (1943); Massey v. War
Emergency Co-op. Ass'n, 209 S.C. 292, 39 S.E.2d 907 (1946); Keseleff v. Sunset High-
way Motor Freight Co., 187 Wash. 642, 60 P.2d 720 (1936).
26 CALIF. CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 682 (Cont. Ed. Bar 1957).
27 Clark v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 2d at 580, 2 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
28 See, e.g., Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. at 285 (E.D. Ill. 1958); McNelley v.
Perry, 18 F.R.D. at 361 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp. at 613
(D.C. Pa. 1952).
29 See General Elec. Co. v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. 2d 897, 291 P.2d 945 (1955);
Holm v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 2d 500, 267 P.2d 1025 (1954).
30 Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951); Dem-
aree v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 2d 99, 73 P.2d 605 (1937).
31 Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (Mont. 1961).
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sight of the limitations of the discovery rules or the boundaries beyond
which we should not go."32
This fear of doing injustice to the defendant has prevented the courts
from admitting that insurance coverage, as a practical matter, is very rele-
vant to a plaintiff's cause of action.33 To force a plaintiff to litigate a matter
only to find after a judgment in his favor that the defendant is judgment
proof places an inequitable burden upon the injured party and is a grossly
inefficient way of operating a judicial system. The liberalized federal dis-
covery procedures, after which California's new Discovery Act was pat-
terned, were enacted to prevent just such wasteful effort A4
In California the line between relevant and irrelevant is being drawn so
as to favor maximum discovery.35 The line is drawn so that only those dis-
covery procedures which are utilized solely to annoy, embarrass, or oppress
the deponent are prevented; and in each case such deponent must show
good cause why such questioning is annoying, embarrassing, or oppressing.38
Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court37 expressly ruled "fishing expedi-
tions" permissible under California discovery procedure. Emphasizing that
the "game" element of trial and pre-trial procedure is to be eliminated, the
court reviewed the purposes of discovery under the 1957 Discovery Act. One
of these purposes is to educate the parties in advance of trial as to the real
value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging settlements. The
court declared the rule to be not only one of liberal interpretation, but one
that also recognizes that disclosure is a matter of right unless statutory or
public policy considerations clearly prohibit it. Since the fact of liability
insurance is not privileged matter, there is neither statutory nor policy rea-
sons for denying discovery of this fact. The provisions of such a policy are
not a matter for the sole knowledge of the named assured and the insurance
carrier to the exclusion of the injured person. The very pendency of an
action by the injured brought in good faith against the named insured gives
the former a discoverable interest in the policy.38
The Substantive Aspect
One of the early rulings allowing discovery of liability insurance was a
California case in which a proceeding for the perpetuation of testimony
was employed to force the defendant to produce the insurance policy 9 The
defendants alleged that the sanctity of a private contract should not be in-
vaded merely because someone says he someday expects to sue another to
enforce payment of a judgment expected to some day be obtained. The
court rejected the contention on the grounds that an automobile liability
policy evidences a contractual relation created by statute which inures to
321d. at 277.
33 See Jobanek v. Aberle, 27 F.B.D. at 277 n. 10 (Mont. 1961).
34 See 74 HAnv. L. REv. 940, 945 (1961).
35 See Carlson v. Superior Court, 56 A.C. 428 (1961); Cembrook v. Superior Court,
56 A.C. 420 (1961); Filipoff v. Superior Court, 56 A.C. 441 (1961); Greyhound Corp.
v. Superior Court, 56 A.C. 353 (1961); Steele v. Superior Court, 56 A.C. 400 (1961);
West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court, 56 A.C. 405 (1961).
36 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc, §§ 2019(b) & (d).
3756 A.C. 353 (1961).
38 Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951).
soId.
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the benefit of any and every person who might be negligently injured by
the assured as completely as if such injured person had been specifically
named in the policy; that is, a contractual relation is created between the
insurer and injured third parties.40
What is the nature of this contractual relationship between injured and
insurer? Is the insurer directly responsible to the injured party under the
terms of the insurance contract? Is the insurance policy designed solely to
indemnify the insured, or is it designed to benefit all potential victims of
insured's negligence? These are a few of the questions that are involved
when interpreting the California Insurance Code section 11580.
The pertinent part of this code section makes it unlawful to issue an in-
surance policy unless there is a provision stating that the insolvency or
bankruptcy of the insured will not release the insurer from liability for
payment of damages covered under the terms of the policy; and also a pro-
vision that whenever a judgment is secured against the insured, then an
action may be brought against the insurer on the policy, and subject to its
terms and limitations, the judgment creditor may recover on the judgment."'
It is apparent that the legislature intended to place a greater responsibility
upon the insurer than merely that of indemnifying its policyholder against
damages caused by his negligence. Even though the insured is judgment
proof, the insurance carrier cannot escape its obligations to the injured
party.42
The question of whether this obligation arises at the very moment of
injury or only upon judgment against the insured becomes critical in deter-
mining the relevancy of liability insurance in an action against insured. Cali-
fornia courts have ruled that the obligation is created when the injury
occurs, but is not enforcible until a final judgment against the insured has
been entered.4 3 Thus every person is potentially a party to the insurance
contract and the condition upon which the insurance carrier incurs a duty
to any specific party is upon the occurrence of an injury covered by the
policy. Then, in effect, the injured party is subrogated to the rights of the
insured in the policy and upon determination that the insured would be
entitled to indemnity from damages, the injured party has an enforcible
claim against the insurer.
The California rulings have been explained in these words :
4
It is true that in California the contractual obligation may not be enforced until
judgment has first been secured against the person responsible. This, however,
does not detract from the fact that at the time of an accident an injured person
has a right against the insurance company identical with that against the re-
sponsible party, subject only to its establishment by judgment.
40 Accord, Abrams v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 32 Cal. 2d 233, 195 P.2d 797
(1948); Hynding v. Home Ace. Ins. Co., 214 Cal. 743, 7 P.2d 999 (1932); Malmgren
v. Southwestern Auto. Ins. Co., 201 Cal. 29, 255 Pac. 512 (1927).
41 CAL. INS. CODE § 11580(b).
42 See Malmgren v. Southwestern Auto. Ins. Co., 201 Cal. 29, 255 Pac. 512 (1927).
42 See id. at 33, 255 Pac. at 513; Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d at
754, 235 P.2d at 835.
44 State ex rel. Allen v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 69 Nev. 196, 245 P.2d 999
(1952).
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Having established the existence of this contractual relationship at the
time of the injury, it is but a small and logical step for the courts to rule
that the injured party- has a discoverable interest in any insurance policy
covering the incident. The interest in such a -policy is then relevant to the
subject matter of the pending action because the contractual relationship
between the injured and insurer arises out of that very injury. The injured
party should be given the opportunity to investigate his contractual rights
and duties as they relate to the incident which created such interests.
In a recent Illinois case45 where a statute46 similar to California Insur-
ance Code section 11580 is in force, the court determined that an-insurance
policy was relevant to the litigation against the insured defendant because
of such a statutory requirement. Discovery apprises injured plaintiffs of
rights in the matter of litigation of which they might not otherwise avail
themselves. Said the court:47
It is not inconceivable that a plaintiff with serious injuries would settle a sub-
stantial judgment against defendant of modest means for a fractional sum, simply
because he has no knowledge of any additional rights against the insured. Thus
to deprive an injured party from learning of his rights against the insurer would
in effect, nullify the benevolent purpose of such statutes, and permit insurance
companies to avoid their statutory obligation.
It is this substantive and enforcible right of the injured party which must
be given the protection of the courts by allowing discovery of liability in-
surance, policy limits, and policy provisions.
The fact that the contractual relationship between insurer and injured
plays a large part in the court's determination that insurance coverage is
discoverable is illustrated by a recent California decision48 where the in-
surance policy did not fall within section 11580 of the California Insurance
Code. But the court recognized that by its own terms the policy might pro-
vide that a judgment creditor of the insured could bring an action against
the insurer on the policy. The court reviewed the California decisions hold-
ing insurance policies discoverable on the principle of a contractual rela-
tionship and ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to learn from defendant
if they were insured against liability for malpractice and, if so, to see the
policy to determine whether there was any contractual relationship between
plaintiffs and the insurer.49 Thus the California courts are recognizing the
right of an injured party to be informed of his contractual relationship with
an insurance carrier, whether this contractual relationship is created by the
terms of the policy itself, or by the statutory requirement.
Many of the decisions in other jurisdictions denying discovery point out
that there is no statute in the jurisdiction comparable to the California In-
surance Code section 11580.11 The court in Pettie even disdained to review
45People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).
4 6 ILL. INS. CODE § 388.
4 12 III. 2d at 238, 145 N.E.2d at 593.
48 Rolf Holmes, Inc. v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 2d 876, 9 Cal. Rptr. 142
(1960).
• "Id. at 881, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
50 See DiPietruntonio v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746 (1958); Brooks
v. Owens, 97 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1957); Jeppeson v. Swanson, 243 Minn. 547, 68 N.W.2d
649 (1955); Peters v. Webb, 316 P.2d 170 (Okla. 1957).
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the various conflicting cases in other jurisdictions, since no statute compa-
rable to section 11580 was there in existence.5 1 In other words, it appears
that if there is not some statutory provision giving the injured party a con-
tractual relationship with the insurer, or such a provision is not specifically
included in the insurance contract, the courts are prone to regard the exist-
ence and amount of liability insurance as irrelevant to the subject matter of
an action for damages against the insured.
Conclusion
The immediate effect of Pettie is to extend the rule declared in Laddon
to one of the most frequently litigated areas of liability insurance, automo-
bile collisions. Millions of drivers, as well as passengers are thus assured
of obtaining knowledge of their contractual rights before settlement of a
claim for damages. This is perhaps the most important consequence to be
derived from the decision. The court has expressly upheld the plaintiff's
right to be informed about an insurance policy in which he has a contrac-
tual interest.
In so doing, the court has neither invaded the rights nor prejudiced the
interests of the insured. The revelation of facts which enables parties to
carry on useful settlement negotiations should aid rather than harm the
insured. The argument put forth by one writer12 that disclosure of policy
limits encourages plaintiffs to hold out for the upper limit when they might
otherwise settle does not seem to be borne out in practice.5 3 It is just as
probable that a plaintiff, guessing blindly as to the defendant's ability to
satisfy an adverse judgment, would stick to a demand far in excess of what-
ever insurance coverage there might be. As pointed out by one California
court, "Conceivably, knowledge of low policy limits might constitute a
benefit to defendants by tending to discourage a seriously injured plaintiff
from holding out for a settlement commensurate with the extent of the in-
juries." 54 Few plaintiffs are willing to make a settlement for less than the
full amount of damage when it is believed that there is an insurance policy
in existence which would enable the injured party to entirely recoup his
losses. In a case where the defendant is able to negotiate such a settlement
by keeping the fact of liability insurance under a wrap of secrecy, it would
appear that the plaintiff has been manifestly deprived of his proper and just
compensation. Should the matter go as far as a jury trial, the insured and
insurer are still protected by the evidentiary rules of California which make
mention of insurance coverage objectionable and grounds for a new trial.
Often the reason policy limits have not been discoverable is to protect
the insurer. The fear that insurance companies might be subjected to in-
creased pressure to settle at the upper limits of a policy in order to protect
themselves from a possible suit by the insured for negligent failure to settle
has led courts to protect insurance carriers by ruling insurance policies irrel-
51 178 Cal. App. 2d at 686, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 271.
5274 HARV. L. REv. 940, 1019 (1961).
5' See Superior Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d at 755, 235 P.2d at 836.
54Ibid.
55 E.g., Pierce v. United Gas & Elec. Co., 161 Cal. 176, 118 Pac. 700 (1911); Roche
v. Llewellyn Iron Works, 140 Cal. 563, 74 Pac. 147 (1903); Perez v. Crocker, 86 Cal.
App. 288, 260 Pac. 838 (1927).
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evant to an action against the insured.56 But the need for protection from
this danger is to some extent counterbalanced by the possibility that refusal
to disclose policy limits may result in liability on the part of the insurer in
excess of its policy limits in a case where the judgment exceeds the amount
of insurance coverage because such action by an insurer constitutes bad
faith exercised in complete derogation of the right of the policyholder. 57
Whether or not the courts allow discovery of policy limits the insurer is in
a vulnerable position when there is a judgment in excess of the insured's
policy limits and protection of the insurance carrier from this risk is not
accomplished by refusing discovery of policy limits.
On the other hand, Pettie should encourage the prompt and just settle-
ment of personal injury actions where insurance policies are involved. Less
time and money will be spent by litigants in "hide and seek" contests with
unindentified insurers which serve no useful purpose.
The California Supreme Court recently quoted the language of Petrie
to the effect that the presence or absence of liability insurance is frequently
the controlling factor in determining the manner in which a case is prepared
for trial. That there will be actual rather than nominal recovery conditions
every aspect of preparation for trial of these cases-investigators, doctors,
photographers and even the taking of depositions. 58
The point has been made that to allow discovery of policy limits and not
allow discovery of defendant's other assets is inconsistent; that if a party is
allowed to determine the amount of insurance coverage an opposing party
has, he ought also be allowed to discover defendant's other assets such as
stocks, bonds, real estate and bank accounts.5 9 The answer to this argument
was concisely expressed by the Illinois court in its statement that, "Unlike
other assets, a liability insurance policy exists for the single purpose of sat-
isfying the liability that it covers. It has no other function and no other
value."60 This peculiarity of purpose sets the liability insurance policy apart
from other types of assets and makes apparent the need to insure that an
injured party is made cognizant of his rights arising from the injury.
Finally, the end to be served by discovery procedures is the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of actions.6' In allowing discovery of liability
insurance and the limits thereof the California courts have removed another
impediment to the accomplishment of this goal. Discovery of policy limits
means that opposing parties may make settlement offers with the full assur-
ance that they are not forfeiting any of their rights kept hidden by an arbi-
trary rule of procedure. Parties dealing openly with one another in the
confidence that each has a complete understanding of the situation are more
likely to arrive at a mutually acceptable settlement than parties who are
secretive and defensive about disclosing information necessary for settlement
negotiation. The California courts should continue to foster the disclosure
of all facts which may be pertinent to a cause of action and this includes
56 See 74 HAIv. L. REv. 940, 1019 (1961).
57 Appleman, Circumstances Creating Excess Liability, A.B.A. REP. 315 (1960).
58 Rolf Holmes, Inc. v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. App. 2d at 879, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
5 9 Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283, 285 (E.D. Ill. 1958).
6o People ex el. Terry v. Fisher, 12 INI. 2d at 238, 145 N.E.2d at 593.
61 FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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